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Insightful problem solving is a vital part of human thinking, yet very difficult to grasp. Traditionally, insight has been investigated by using a set of established “insight tasks,” assuming
that insight has taken place if these problems are solved. Instead of assuming that insight
takes place during every solution of the 9 Dot, 8 Coin, and Matchstick Arithmetic Problems,
this study explored the likelihood that solutions evoked the “Aha! experience,” which is often
regarded as the defining characteristic of insight. It was predicted that the rates of selfreported Aha! experiences might vary based on the necessary degree of constraint relaxation. The main assumption was that the likelihood of experiencing an Aha! would decrease
with increasing numbers of constraints that must be relaxed, because several steps are
needed to achieve a representational change and solve the problem, and thus, the main
feature of suddenness of a solution might be lacking. The results supported this prediction,
and demonstrated that in many cases participants do solve these classical insight problems
without any Aha! experience. These results show the importance of obtaining insight ratings
from participants to determine whether any given problem is solved with insight or not.

Most people know the phenomenon that after some struggle
with a difficult problem, the solution simply appears out of
nowhere. Such a moment of sudden comprehension is known
as insight. Insight is thought to follow from restructuring or
representational change processes (Duncker, 1945; Ohlsson, 1984). This means the problem solver sets up an initial
mental representation of the problem that is biased because
of unnecessary, false assumptions about the task. The resulting problem space is over-constrained (Ohlsson, 1992) or
ill-defined (Kaplan & Simon, 1990). This problem representation needs to be changed in a proper way to increase the
likelihood of solving the problem. On a phenomenological
level of description, the moment of representational change
is often reported being accompanied by a strong emotional
response, the “Aha! experience” (Bühler, 1907; Gick & Lockhart, 1995; Kaplan & Simon, 1990).
After 100 years of problem solving research, the cognitive mechanisms underlying insight are still not fully
understood. There are various conceptual and experimental
reasons for that, including the repeated usage of a limited set
of tasks assumed to be “insight problems,” combined with
the fact that there is no clear behavioral nor neural marker
indicating that insight has taken place (Dietrich & Kanso,
2010), and the difficulty of discerning if a problem has been
solved via insightful problem solving or more analytical

processes (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). This relates to another
long-standing discussion about whether insight problems
are something special or not (Davidson, 1995). In the past,
some researchers have assumed that when “insight problems” are solved, then insight has taken place (Ash, Cushen,
& Wiley, 2009; Weisberg, 1992). This reasoning is problematic and becomes circular if, as Öllinger and Knoblich point
out, “Insight problems are problems that require insight,
and insight occurs when insight problems are solved“ (2009,
p. 3). There have been attempts at classifying and defining the
properties of insight problems (e.g., Weisberg, 1995), but there
is no clear agreement on which types of problems will always
trigger insight, because “there is no particular class of insight
problems that necessarily requires a representational change;
each problem can be solved without insight if the initial problem representation is adequate and the appropriate heuristics
are available” (Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2014, p. 267).
More recently, researchers interested in detecting possible
neural correlates of insight have begun to rely on the phenomenological dimension of insight, the Aha! experience
(e.g., Aziz-Zadeh, Kaplan, & Iacoboni, 2009; Bowden, JungBeeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Sandkühler & Bhattacharya, 2008) that sets it apart from more analytical modes of
problem solving. The Aha! experience is generally described
as very pleasant, connected with emotional arousal and with
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a strong certainty that the solution is correct (Sternberg &
Davidson, 1995). Most phenomenological approaches use
subjective reports of Aha! experiences to differentiate insightful (“with Aha!”) from noninsightful (“without Aha!”) solving events, assuming that “the presence or absence of insight
resides in the solver’s solution rather than in the problem”
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007, p. 88). From these observations, it is clear that the occurrence of insight should not
be assumed, and can be assessed by directly asking problem
solvers about it. Although often used in insight research, no
prior work has asked participants to give ratings of insight
on three widely used classical insight problems: The 9 Dot
Problem (Maier, 1930), the 8 Coin Problem (Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002), and one Matchstick Arithmetic
Problem (e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999).
Thus, collecting subjective Aha! ratings on these problems in
order to verify their status as insight problems was a goal of
the present study.
Subjective Measures of Insight
The present study collected self-reports about participants’
Aha! experiences using the multi-dimensional definition by
Jung-Beeman and colleagues (2004) to test whether insight
ratings are predicted by the degree of representational
change that might be required for each of these problems.
Empirical studies have successfully implemented subjective
ratings of insight for several types of problems. This has been
mainly the case for the domain of compound remote associates (CRA problems, Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). Based
on participants’ self-reports of insight (using a definition that
included suddenness, obviousness, and confidence), it was
possible to detect differences between insight and noninsight
solutions with regard to neural activity as measured by EEG
and fMRI (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Subramaniam, Kounios,
Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2009). Another study (Kounios et
al., 2006) was even able to show that the neural activity differed already in a preparatory interval before the problem
was presented, predicting whether it would later be solved
with or without insight. Kounios and Beeman (2014) provide
an overview on this work, but see also Dietrich and Kanso
(2010) for a review. Ellis and colleagues combined post-hoc
insight ratings of how suddenly the solution came to mind
with eye tracking while participants were trying to solve 60
anagram problems (Ellis, Glaholt, & Reingold, 2011). Participants were presented with an array of five scrambled letters,
four of which could be combined into a solution word, and
the fifth letter was a distractor. They found that insight trials
had shorter response times and different patterns of fixation
than noninsight trials, showing that the subjective differentiation made by participants was actually reflected in differences in behavioral measures. This shows the usefulness
of self-reports. However, they found increasingly shorter

viewing times on the distractor item already several seconds
prior to the response and interpreted this as evidence for a
gradual accumulation of solution knowledge even before
participants were aware of the solution. Importantly, this was
found for both insight and noninsight trials, suggesting a dissociation between the subjective experience of “suddenness”
of the solution and the actual problem solving process. This
questions the reliability of self-reports. Note that their definition of insight focused solely on suddenness in contrast to
the multi-dimensional definition of insight as used by JungBeeman and colleagues (2004) and also in the present study.
Cushen and Wiley (2012) used a single-trial design with
only one task, the Triangle of Circles, in a large study where
they obtained post-hoc ratings of insight (based on just two
aspects of solution: suddenness and surprise), but also repeated
ratings on problem features during the problem solving process as a measure of representational change (Ash & Wiley,
2008). In concurrence with Ellis and colleagues, they found
a disconnect between self-reports of insight and the actual
solution patterns. As one possible explanation for this finding, they point out the difficulties in providing clear descriptions of insight or Aha! that participants can use as the basis
for their self-reports. A large variety of different instructions
can be found in the literature, and this may be responsible for
different findings across studies. This important point will be
discussed in more detail at the end of the present paper.
Problem Analysis based on Representational Change
The theoretical framework for the present study is Öllinger’s
extended representational change theory (eRCT, Öllinger
et al., 2014), which is based on and elaborates Ohlsson’s
RCT (Knoblich et al., 1999; Ohlsson, 1992). Some of the
key assumptions of the eRCT are sketched in the following.
First, as already discussed, any problem can be solved with
or without insight. Second, in line with Ohlsson, insight is
assumed to be caused by a representational change. A representational change leads to modified prior knowledge and a
modified search space, so that after a representational change,
heuristics are needed to guide the search process again. Third,
and this is a new aspect, insight problem solving is conceptualized as a dynamic search process that might also include
recursive steps, that is, repeated instances of search, impasse,
and representational change. One possibility to achieve a
representational change is through the hypothetical process
of constraint relaxation (Isaak & Just, 1995; Knoblich et al.,
1999; Ohlsson, 1992). Self-imposed constraints that prevent
a solution (for example, assumptions about rules that do not
apply and that were never explicitly stated) need to be overcome or relaxed before the problem can be solved.
The present study predicted that the rates of self-reported
Aha! experiences might vary based on the necessary degree
of constraint relaxation. The main assumption was that the
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likelihood of experiencing an Aha! would decrease with
increasing numbers of constraints that must be relaxed,
because several steps are needed to achieve a representational
change and solve the problem and thus, the main feature of
suddenness of a solution might be lacking. In the following,
each of the three problems used will be discussed in light
of the potential constraints that they might impose on the
problem solver.
Matchstick Arithmetic Problem. Knoblich and colleagues (1999; see
also Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001; and Öllinger, Jones, &
Knoblich, 2008) created a taxonomy of different types of Matchstick Arithmetic. Problem difficulty was theoretically inferred
from the degree of necessary constraint relaxation, and then
empirically verified (Knoblich et al., 1999). A matchstick task
from the operator problem type (CR2, see Öllinger et al., 2008),
requiring an intermediate degree of constraint relaxation, was
selected for this study. To solve this problem, the problem solver
has to overcome one main constraint, namely the assumption
that operators in equations should remain constant. A second
constraint is posed by requiring the problem solver to break up
the chunk that is formed by the operator (the “=” sign), using
chunk decomposition (instead of moving a single matchstick
that is not a part of a perceptual group).
8 Coin Problem (Ormerod et al., 2002). A study by Öllinger and colleagues (Öllinger, Jones, Faber, & Knoblich, 2013) was able
to disentangle the different sources of difficulty in the 8 Coin
Problem by systematically varying perceptual aspects of the
original problem. They found that the main source of difficulty was caused by a self-imposed 2-D constraint, but that
even after a cue was given that showed coins stacked on top of
each other (relaxing the 2-D constraint), an additional source
of difficulty remained that originated from the tight perceptual
groupings of the coins. Thus, decomposing the tight chunks in
order to overcome these perceptual groupings represented a
second constraint that was shown to hinder the solution.
9 Dot Problem (Maier, 1930). It has been shown by Kershaw and
Ohlsson (2004) that the 9 Dot Problem entails several sources
of difficulty. Even after relaxing the boundary constraint (i.e.,
realizing that the lines have to be drawn across the borders
of the imaginary square), several obstacles remain before one
can reach solution. In fact, many solvers are not able to reach
a solution for the 9 Dot Problem, even with explicit hints
(Chronicle, Ormerod, & MacGregor, 2001), because the new
search space is too large. Just recently, Öllinger and colleagues
were able to identify the necessity to restrict the new, larger
search space after the relaxation of the boundary constraint as
key to solution (Öllinger et al., 2014). In particular, realizing
the necessity of so-called “non-dot turns” seems to constitute
an additional constraint for the problem solver (Kershaw &
Ohlsson, 2004). In addition, the number of non-dot turns

required for a solution influenced solution rates, too, with
lower solution rates for problems with two or more turns
compared to problems with a single turn (Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004). There is a further constraint, namely realizing
that one of the dots (the “apex dot”) must be crossed with
lines repeatedly (Öllinger et al., 2014). The ability to engage
in mental look-ahead to consider or imagine the placement
of the 4 lines also seems to constrain solution success (Chein,
Weisberg, Streeter, & Kwok, 2010; MacGregor, Ormerod,
& Chronicle, 2001). As a result, there are at least three constraints that may need to be relaxed in solving this problem.
HypothesEs
Assuming that problems with more constraints are less likely
to trigger sudden Aha! experiences, differing rates of reported
Aha! experiences are expected among the three problems. Specifically, we predict lower rates of reported Aha! experiences
for the 9 Dot Problem because it entails more constraints that
need to be relaxed than the two other problems. The Matchstick Arithmetic Problem requires overcoming the constraint
that operators are not to be manipulated, and decomposing
the operator. The 8 Coin Problem requires overcoming the
2-D constraint and decomposing the tight perceptual grouping. Finally, the 9 Dot Problem requires the solver to overcome the boundary constraint, to make non-dot turns, to use
an apex dot, and to use mental-lookahead to restrict the much
too large search space after the boundary constraint has been
relaxed. Consequently, if the Aha! experience is tightly bound
to constraint relaxation, we expect higher rates of reported
Aha! experiences for the Matchstick Problem and for the 8
Coin Problem than for the 9 Dot Problem.

Method
Participants
Healthy volunteers (N = 45, 14 males), most of them students (age M = 24; range: 20–33), were recruited through
announcements at the University of Munich. After giving
informed consent, each participant was tested individually.
None of them had any neurological diseases and all had normal or corrected-to-normal acuity.
Materials
9 Dot Problem. This classical task (Maier, 1930) consists of 9
dots that must be connected with 4 continuous lines, without lifting the pen. In the correct solution, the lines extend
through the “barriers” of the virtual square (see Appendix
for problem solutions). Participants were presented with the
dots depicted on a sheet of paper (as seen in Figure 1) and
drew the lines directly on the sheet where space was provided for three separate drawing attempts.
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Figure
Figure 1
Figure
2 2. Initial configuration of the 8 Coin Problem.
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PROBLEMS
WITHOUT
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Initial configuration of the 9 Dot Problem.
Initial
configuration
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8 Coin Problem.
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Figure 3. Initial configuration of the Matchstick Arithmetic Problem.
on top of each cluster. The eight 20-cent coinsCR2).
were The
spread
Roman
numerals
were constructed
out ofArithmetic
matchsticks,
and participants
Initial
configuration
of the Matchstick
Problem.
out on a table and participants were allowed to touch the coins
Aha! if the
solutionstatement
occurs to you
andone
stepwise.
and move them around during the problem solving
process. Nothe incorrect
to transform
arithmetic
into slowly
a correct
by moving only
As an example, imagine a light bulb that is switched on
hints were given. The initial arrangement of the coins (depicted
all attask
oncerequires
in contrast
to slowly
dimming
up. Wesign
askand putting
in Figure 2) was always visible on a sheet of paper
so that they
matchstick.
The given
moving
a stick
from theit equal
Procedure
for your subjective rating whether it felt like an Aha!
could get back to the start configuration at any time.
wasisseated
in a quiet
room and
was provided
by w
th
orparticipant
not,
no right
orstatement
wrong
answer.
minus sign: VIIIIndividually,
- experience
VI = II. each
Again,
thethere
initial
arithmetic
(see
Figure 3)
Matchstick Arithmetic Problem. This problem was taken from
Just follow your intuition.
experimenter with a clear description of insightful (“with Aha!”) and noninsightful (“withou
a group of previously used matchstick arithmetic tasks
on a sheet of paper,Participants
with wooden
matchsticks
below.
were
told that provided
they would
need Participants
to sort theirwere ask
(Knoblich et al., 1999): VIII = VI - II (operator type problem,
Aha!”) solution experiences. To ensure comparability across studies, we used wording adapte
CR2). The Roman numerals were constructed out of match- solutions on a trial-by-trial basis into these two categothe matchsticks, ries.
but could
at any
time.
They etrestart
were
then
asked
totosolve
the three insight probsticks, and participants were asked to transform the incorfrom Jung-Beeman
al., (2004)
(translated
German):
rect arithmetic statement into a correct one by moving only lems within an upper time limit of 7 minutes each. Each
wouldwas
like to
know whether
you experienced
feeling ofinstruction,
insight when you solve
problem
separately
instructed
with a awritten
one single matchstick. The given task requires moving a stick “We
andproblem.
participants
were
askedis to
indicate
if they
were already
from the equal sign and putting it onto the minus sign: VIII - the
A feeling
of insight
a kind
of “Aha!”
characterized
by suddenness an
familiar
with
a
problem.
Problem
order
was
balanced
across
VI = II. Again, the initial arithmetic statement (see Figure 3)
an enlightenment.
Youcoins,
are relatively
confident
thatwere
your solution i
participants.Like
Matchsticks,
20-cent
paper, and
pencil
was depicted on a sheet of paper, with wooden matchsticks obviousness.
provided.
The experimenter measured the solution time with a
provided below. Participants were asked to move the match- correct
without having to check it. In contrast, you experienced no Aha! if the solutio
watch, from a separate adjacent room. Upon producing a corsticks, but could restart at any time.
occurs
to you slowly
andthe
stepwise.
an example,
imaginewas
a light
bulb that
rect solution
within
timeAs
limit,
the solution
shown
to is switche
Procedure
the experimenter, who confirmed its correctness. When the
on all at once in contrast to slowly dimming it up. We ask for your subjective ratin
Individually, each participant was seated in a quiet room and proposed solution was incorrect, the participant was told so
and could
solving.
The experimenter
then
asked
par-answer. Jus
it feltresume
like an Aha!
experience
or not, there is no
right
or wrong
was provided by the experimenter with a clear description of whether
ticipants
whether
they
had
experienced
an
Aha!
or
not.
If
they
insightful (“with Aha!”) and noninsightful (“without Aha!”)
follow your intuition.”
solution experiences. To ensure comparability across studies, failed to produce a correct solution within the upper time limit,
experimenter
the
participant
without
tellwe used wording adapted from Jung-Beeman and colleagues the
Participants
were toldinterrupted
that they would
need
to sort theirand,
solutions
on a trial-by-trial
basi
ing the solution, moved on and presented the next problem.
(2004) (translated to German):

into these two categories. They were then asked to solve the three insight problems within a

We would like to know whether you experienced a feellimit of 7 minutes each. Each problem was separately instructed with a writte
Results
ing of insight when you solved the problem. A feelingupper time
of insight is a kind of “Aha!” characterized by sudden-instruction, and participants were asked to indicate if they were already familiar with a problem
Because the problems were already familiar to participants
ness and obviousness. Like an enlightenment. You are
was
Matchsticks, 20-cent
coins, paper, and penc
8.9%
ofbalanced
all 135 across
trials participants.
(135 = 45 participants
x 3 problems),
relatively confident that your solution is correct with-Probleminorder
these trials
had to be
discarded.
Solutions
were
further
out having to check it. In contrast, you experienced nowere provided.
The experimenter
measured
the solution
time with
a watch,
from a separat

adjacent room. Upon producing a correct
the time
limit, the
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps
| Volume
9 solution was show
50 solution within2016

A. H. Danek, J. Wiley, & M. Öllinger

Insight Problems Without Aha!

Table 1
Solution rates (frequencies) for the three problems. For unsolved trials, no Aha! could be reported.
Note that the percentages for each column sum to 100%.

Solved With Aha!
Solved Without Aha!
Unsolved
Familiar

Matchstick

8 Coin

9 Dot

Σ

19 (42.2%)
18 (40.0%)
6 (13.4%)
2 (4.4%)

8 (17.8%)
4 (8.9%)
31 (68.9%)
2 (4.4%)

1 (2.2%)
4 (8.9%)
32 (71.1%)
8 (17.8%)

28 (20.7%)
26 (19.3%)
69 (51.1%)
12 (8.9%)

divided into solved with Aha! and solved without Aha! categories. The distributions of solutions to the four categories (Solved with Aha!, Solved without Aha!, Unsolved, and
Familiar) are shown in Table 1.
An Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) was computed to examine whether the three problems resulted in
similar patterns of frequencies across the three solution categories. This analysis yielded a low and negative ICC of -.046,
indicating disagreement between the three problems. This
means, the patterns of the solution score differed, as can also
be seen in Figure 4 (next page).
Cochran’s Q Test for two related samples was used to further explore the disagreements in solution rates and Aha!
rates as shown in Figure 4. These pairwise comparisons
showed that the Matchstick solution rate (82.2%) was significantly higher than the solution rates of 8 Coin (26.7%) (Q(1)
= 22.5, p < 0.01) and 9 Dot (11.1%) (Q(1) = 24, p < 0.01), but
that solution rates did not differ between the 8 Coin and 9
Dot (Q(1) = 2.3, p = 0.13).
Across all problem types, participants reported that they
had experienced an Aha! in only 51.9% of all correctly solved
trials. First, the proportion of Aha! experiences out of total
opportunities were analyzed because this led to more cells
with 5 or more observations. Cochran’s Q Test for 2 related
samples indicated that the rate of reported Aha! experiences
for Matchsticks was significantly higher than the rate for 8
Coin (Q(1) = 5.8, p < 0.05) as well as for 9 Dot (Q(1) = 16.2,
p < 0.01). Also, the Aha! rate for 8 Coin was significantly
higher than the one for 9 Dot (Q(1) = 5.4, p < 0.05).
The proportion of Aha! experiences out of correct solutions was also examined, even though nearly all cells had
fewer than 5 observations due to extremely low solving rates
for 9 Dot and 8 Coin. This may be a more theoretically informative analysis because its results are independent of the
greatly differing solution rates of the three problems, and it
also takes into account that Aha! experiences could only be
reported in solved trials. Looking at the data this way, the 9
Dot Problem received the lowest ratio with only 20% of solutions accompanied by an Aha! The Matchsticks Problem led
to an Aha! in 51.4% of solutions, and the 8 Coin in 66.7%
of solutions. However, Cochran’s Q Test for 2 related samples, which was computed for the same three comparisons as

previously, was never significant, Matchstick vs. 8 Coin with
(Q(1) = 0.2, p = 0.66), Matchstick vs. 9 Dot with (Q(1) = 0.3,
p = 0.56), and 8 Coin vs. 9 Dot with (Q(1) = 1.0, p = 0.32).

Discussion
The present study examined solution rates and self-reported
Aha! ratings for three classical insight problems. First, the
solution rates were found to differ across the three problems,
and these solution rates can be compared to those found in
previous studies. Due to its notorious difficulty, researchers
only rarely implement the 9 Dot Problem without hints, as was
done in this study, but one such study reports solution rates of
0% after participants were allowed 10 trials of drawing different solution attempts in a booklet (MacGregor et al., 2001),
but given no solution feedback. Another study (Chein et al.,
2010) reports very similar solution rates to the one found here,
namely 10% (five participants from a n = 51 sample).
For the 8 Coin Problem, comparing the present results to
Ormerod’s original study (2002), there is a strikingly large
difference in solution rates: They found 0% during a time
interval of four minutes. After these four minutes, participants were given two hints, which raised solution rates to
92%. There are several possible explanations for this difference: First, it should be noted that Ormerod and colleagues
collected only pilot data of 12 participants using this original
coin configuration. Second, it is not clear whether participants had previously been informed that they would receive
the hints. If so, this could have influenced solution rates.
Third, the test material was different: Ormerod used hexagonal metal tokens (possibly based in British 20- and 50-pence
coins) in order to facilitate the evaluation of the number
of contacts between coins, whereas this study used 20-cent
Euro coins, which are circular. This may have increased the
difficulty of chunk decomposition because the hexagonal
tokens create a more “tight” perceptual grouping than the
circular coins. Fourth, the time limits differed (four minutes
in the original study before a hint was given; seven minutes
here). That time is a crucial factor is further supported by
the comparison with another study on the 8 Coin Problem, where an even higher solution rate, 40%, was reported
(Öllinger et al., 2013) and participants were allowed as many
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Figure
Figure
4.4Number of participants (out of 45) who solved the problem with or without reporting
Number of participants (out of 45) who solved the problem with or without reporting an Aha! experito solve,failed
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with the
problem.
anence,
Aha!failed
experience,
to solve,
or familiar
were already
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with the problem.

solution attempts as they wished. That both the present study all solvers reported an Aha! experience. The present finding
and Öllinger’s study tested larger samples (45 and 28, respec- that only half of all solutions were classified as Aha! solutions
tively) than the originalCochran’s
study (12 Qparticipants),
might be
an casts
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on the explore
researchthepractice
of simply assuming that
Test for two related
samples
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to further
disagreements
additional reason for the differing solution rates.
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in solution
rates itand
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ratesdifficult
as shown
Figure
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comparisons
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that had solved the 9
For the Matchstick
Problem,
was
rather
to in
find
particular,
only 1 out
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studies using exactly the same problem configuration, but Dot Problem reported an Aha! experience. Of course, this
the Matchstick
(82.2%)
was
than the solution
rates of 8problematic
Coin
comparable problems
from the solution
operatorrate
group
(CR2)
ledsignificantly
to makeshigher
this problem
seem especially
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solution rates around 60% after six minutes (Öllinger et al., used as a typical “insight problem” without any concurrent
(26.7%)
(Q(1)solution
= 22.5,rates
p<0.01)
and 9problems
Dot (11.1%)
(Q(1) = 24, p<0.01),
but that solution
2008). Another study
reports
for CR2
measurements
of participants’
actualrates
solving experience.
of about 68% after five minutes (data from block 1 of Experi- Further, the fact that some participants received feedback
did not differ between the 8 Coin and 9 Dot (Q(1) = 2.3, p = 0.13).
ment 2 in Knoblich et al., 1999). Note that in contrast to the about their solution accuracy before reaching a correct solupresent design, both studies
presented
the types,
Matchstick
Prob- reported
tion could
have had
contributed
to the
low overall
Aha! rates if
Across
all problem
participants
that they
experienced
an Aha!
in
lems on a computer screen and had participants solve them “in we see this feedback as a sort of hint, because it has been
the head.” Another
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that bothsolved
studiestrials.
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that providing
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only
51.9% ofwas
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proportion
of Aha! experiences
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(Cushen
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1995).
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more
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moreDavidson,
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(Öllinger et al., 2008). Together with the lower time limit, this
The main question that was tested by the present study was
Test forrates
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samples
that the rate
reported
Aha! experiences
for
might account forCochran’s
the lowerQsolution
in prior
work.indicated whether
the of
rates
of self-reported
Aha! experiences
in three
Second, although the problems used here have all been classical insight problems could be predicted based on the
was significantly
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for 8 Coindegree
(Q(1) =of5.8,
p<0.05) asrelaxation.
well as forAs expected, difconsidered to beMatchsticks
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” participants
constraint
that they had only experienced an Aha! approximately half fering rates of Aha! (based on total solving opportunities)
9 Dot (Q(1) = 16.2, p<0.01). Also, the Aha! rate for 8 Coin was significantly higher than the
the time that problems were solved correctly. Compared were found across the three problems: The Matchstick Probto other studiesone
using
ratings, the pres- lem triggered the highest Aha! rates, followed by the 8 Coin
for 9trial-wise
Dot (Q(1)insight
= 5.4, p<0.05).
ent finding is quite typical. Other studies, using CRA prob- Problem, and then the 9 Dot Problem with the lowest rate.
lems, report numbers between 50% and 60% (Kounios et al., Note that if proportions of solutions are analysed instead of
2008; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Sandkühler & Bhattacha- proportions of total problem attempts, there is a small change
rya, 2008; Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky, Kounios, & Bee- in the overall pattern such that the rate for 8 Coin appears
man, 2012). Fedor, Szathmáry, and Öllinger (2015) found higher and more similar to the rate for Matchsticks. However,
for Katona’s Five Square Problem (Katona, 1940) that 74% of the main result of the 9 Dot Problem triggering a much lower
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Aha! rate than the other two problems stays the same across
both analyses. This is consistent with the hypothesis that solutions for which fewer constraints need to be relaxed feel more
sudden and thus more like an “Aha!” than multi-step solutions with several constraints that must be overcome.
An alternative to considering the number of constraints is
considering the type of constraints that need to be relaxed,
the consequences that follow from relaxation, and the order
in which the constraints are relaxed. These factors influence
whether the search space for a given problem gets enlarged
(making a solution less likely) or restricted (facilitating a solution). Starting with the 8 Coin Problem, assume that the first
constraint to be relaxed would be the 2-D constraint. When
it is relaxed, it increases the search space for solution. However, as soon as the solver is able to overcome the perceptual
grouping and considers breaking up the adjacent coins, then
there are only two coins that can be moved to break up the
starting configuration into two equal groups of three coins.
This means relaxing the second constraint (perceptual grouping) in the 8 Coin Problem restricts the search space again
and thus might quickly lead to a solution. Of course the order
in which these two constraints are relaxed could theoretically
also be reversed: The problem solver could realize first that
it is necessary to break up the tight perceptual grouping and
form two separate groups of three coins each by taking the
two “inner” coins and then, while moving them around, relax
the 2-D constraint. For this sequence of constraint relaxation,
which appears less likely than the first, breaking up the grouping might already feel like a restriction of the search space
(since the target coins are identified), but this does not necessarily lead to a solution. Only if the problem solver proceeds
with relaxing the second remaining constraint (2-D), and
realizes that coins must be stacked on top of each other, does
the search space finally narrow. This solution process appears
less swift than the prior one and thus might be less likely to
be accompanied by Aha! experiences, because the criterion of
suddenness is lacking. This could account for the small proportion of solutions without Aha! for the 8 Coin Problem.
Similarly, with the Matchstick Problem, there are two constraints that need to be relaxed. The solver needs to overcome
the assumption that operators are not to be manipulated and
also recognize that the perceptual grouping of the operator (the equal sign) needs to be decomposed. Because these
constraints are both directly related to the operator, relaxing
one constraint might relate to simultaneously relaxing the
other, quickly restricting the search space, and thus lead suddenly to a solution. If the two constraints are instead relaxed
sequentially, the most likely sequence would be to first relax
the operator constraint and then decompose the grouping.
However, the reverse order seems also plausible: First, participants might realize that they must break up chunks such
as the V (which enlarges the search space since not only

the individual matchsticks that make up numerals such as
II and III can be used, but also the ones belonging to the
V), and later they might realize that the operator must be
manipulated (again, closing the search space). This sequence
appears as likely as the first, but less likely to trigger a feeling
of suddenness and Aha! This reasoning could account for the
larger proportion of solutions without Aha! for the Matchstick Problem than the 8 Coin.
In contrast, the solution process for the 9 Dot Problem
seems to be qualitatively very different. When the first constraint is relaxed (the boundary constraint), it enlarges the
search space. Realizing that one needs to make non-dot
turns, however, does not restrict the enlarged search space
because they could, theoretically, be made at any location
outside the area of the given nine dots (Öllinger et al., 2014).
Thus, relaxing the second constraint in the 9 Dot Problem
might not lead as quickly to a solution as in the other problems because there still remain several other constraints such
as realizing that one needs to use an apex dot, or finding the
correct number of non-dot turns. Because there are multiple constraints that need to be relaxed, and because achieving each of these partial insights is likely to occur over an
extended span of time rather than all at once, solutions to the
9 Dot Problem are less likely to trigger a feeling of suddenness and Aha! regardless of the order they are relaxed in. This
could account for the large number of solutions that were not
accompanied by an Aha! experience for this problem.
Of course, depending on their prior knowledge, problem
solvers might not encounter all constraints that have been
identified in the above task analysis. In addition, the order
in which constraints are likely to be relaxed for each problem as discussed above are hypothetical, as the present study
did not collect any trace data that might be used to confirm
these assumptions. Ideally, future research should employ
converging methods including think-aloud or eye-tracking
methods that might be used to track solution processes, in
addition to obtaining self-reports about Aha! experiences, so
that the connection between solution processes and the Aha!
experience can be made more directly.
This relates to some other conceptual limitations of the present study. For example, it remains unclear whether a representational change actually took place or whether an impasse
occurred during solving. Thus, the results of this study cannot
speak to the question of possible differences in the problem
solving process between participants reporting Aha! and participants not reporting it. Several methods have been used in
the past to try to capture problem solving processes. In addition
to using think-aloud protocols (Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012; Cranford & Moss, 2012; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Newell & Simon,
1972), recording eye movements can also offer valuable insights
into the solution process (Knoblich et al., 2001; Ellis et al., 2011).
Another alternative is to conduct a move analysis (Öllinger et
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al., 2013; Ormerod et al., 2002) where the experimenter records
the start and end point of each move while participants are solving problems with external objects. Examining the frequency
of first moves can be used to infer possible biases in the initial
problem representation. Similarly, recording when participants
first start stacking coins on top of each other, going outside of
the perimeter of the box, and touching or pointing to the operators in the matchstick problem can be used to infer when participants relax constraints. A detailed move analysis can also
be conducted online, with a computer program recording participants’ drag-and-drop mouse movements and reaction times
(Fedor, Szathmáry, & Öllinger, 2015). Finally, obtaining ratings
of problem features at multiple time points (Ash & Wiley, 2008;
Cushen & Wiley, 2012) can also be used to track changes in
problem representations during the solution process.
Collecting subjective measures of Aha! experiences has the
advantage that it offers researchers the possibility to compare
insight with noninsight solutions instead of just assuming that
problems are being solved with insight. This was first successfully done by Jung-Beeman and colleagues (2004) with their
set of CRA problems, but other promising new approaches to
insight research, such as Rebus puzzles (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008) or magic tricks (Danek, Fraps, von Müller,
Grothe, & Öllinger, 2013, 2014b), offer the same possibility
because a large set of tasks can be created. In particular, the
domain of magic tricks seems ideally suited to investigate
insight because the typical constraints encountered by problem solvers are well-known and systematically manipulated
by the magician, triggering an initial problem representation
that is misleading. When participants gain insight into a magic
trick, that is, discover how the trick works, they report strong
feelings of Aha! (Danek, Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, & Öllinger,
2014a). Further, Danek and colleagues found that solutions to
magic tricks that occurred with insight were reached earlier,
received higher confidence ratings, and were also more likely
to be true than noninsight solutions (2014b).
Across studies, variations in experimenters’ instructions
for insight ratings may be responsible for different findings.
The simple dichotomic insight/noninsight rating used here
is probably not sufficient to fully capture the complex phenomenology of the Aha! experience, which has been shown
to consist of at least 4 different components, namely “suddenness,” “surprise,” ‘happiness,” and “certainty” (Danek et al.,
2014a). Further components, like the feeling of relief upon
obtaining the solution or heightened motivation for the next
task, were suggested when participants were asked to provide qualitative self-reports instead of ratings (“For you, how
does an Aha! moment feel like? Please describe it in your own
words!”, Danek et al., 2014a, p. 5). Processing fluency has also
been suggested as an underlying mechanism (Topolinski &
Reber, 2010). Only some of these components are reflected
in the instruction that was used in the present study. This

limitation also applies to many other studies using self-reports
of insight, with some of them assessing only the component of
suddenness (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2011). Further
research is needed to disentangle these different aspects of the
Aha! experience and their relations to the solution process.
Obviously, the optimal method for determining the occurrence of insight has not been found yet. As one step toward
this aim, instead of using predefined insight problems and
assuming the occurrence of insight if the problem is solved,
researchers need converging subjective or behavioral measures that can help to take into account participants’ actual
problem solving experiences.
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A. Solution for the 9 Dot Problem.

B. Solution for the 8 Coin Problem.

C. Solution for the Matchstick Arithmetic Problem.
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